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per curiam opinion denying a rehearing declares the court's decision
had been based on Richardson's inability "to purchase the stock for
his own benefit without having given his principal reasonable notice
of his intention to renounce the mandate," and on his acquisition
of the stock "as trustee for the account of his principal, who became
the rightful owner thereof."
Thus the supreme court resorted to the constructive trust in a
case in which it considered the agent to have acted in violation of
his fiduciary duty. The result is eminently fair and just, but the
theory of the case demonstrates the inadequacy of our legislation
in such situations. Perhaps a simpler solution would have been to
deny that a denunciation with the intention of acting contrary to
the interests of the principal can be effective and then to refuse to
consider any act of the agent as being in violation of his obligations.
In this way the constructive trust, with its non-civilian implications
of separation of legal and equitable title and of formalism as opposed
to substantivism in transactions, could be avoided.
CONVENTIONAL OBLIGATIONS
1. Denson Smith*
Although not many cases falling within this classification were
decided during the 1946-1947 session of the supreme court, there
were a few of more than passing interest.
A very interesting situation developed in the case of Mallet v.
Thibault.' An owner of two lots sold one to a Mrs. Rainey from
whom the plaintiff inherited. It was agreed that Mrs. Rainey should
have a servitude across the other lot for perpetual use as a driveway
to her garage. However, this agreement was not written into the
act of sale. Nevertheless, Mrs. Rainey and her tenant made use of
the servitude as intended. Subsequently, the owner entered into a
written agreement to sell the other lot to the defendant- This writ-
ing contained a recitation that the property was sold and purchased
subject to "vendor's previous agreement to allow owner and tenant
of house directly in rear use of driveway for entering and leaving
their garage." But again when the act of sale was accomplished,
this provision was not included therein. When plaintiff was there-
after notified to discontinue using the driveway, she filed this suit
against the purchaser and the original owner seeking judicial recog-
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 81 So. (2d) 601 (La. 1947).
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nition of the claimed right of passage. In sustaining the plaintiff's
action, the court concluded that the provision contained in the
preliminary contract to sell was a stipulation pour autrui which was
not subject to revocation or abrogation by the failure of the owner
and purchaser to include it in the subsequently executed act of sale.
As such, it was sufficient to create a personal servitude, which was
all that was necessary for the court to decide. Acceptance of the
stipulation was found in the continuous use of the driveway by
plaintiff even after the acquisition by the purchaser in question. To
the defendant's contention that, under Article 2236 of the Louisiana
Civil Code, the act of sale was full proof of the agreement contained
therein, and that its provisions could not be enlarged by proof of
the preliminary contract to sell, the court answered that Article 2236
applies only against the contracting parties and their heirs or assigns,
therefore, plaintiff was not bound by it and was free to prove and
enforce the stipulation contained in the original contract.
There was a dissenting opinion by Justice Hamiter who took
the view that the preliminary contract was extinguished, as far as
the owner was concerned, when it ceased to exist and became super-
seded by the notarial act of sale, and that the third party could be
in no better position, because the stipulation "was for the exclusive
benefit of [the owner], and plaintiff's claim under it could be and
was no better than his."
In passing, the quoted language, as well as similar language in
the majority opinion, seems to the writer to be inaccurate. It has
a hoary background, stemming from a gratuitous expression in the
early case of Tiernan v. Martin,2 which has, unhappily, been too
frequently repeated of late.' The statement that stipulations of the
kind here in question are not pour autrui but are exclusively in favor
of the party selling the property is usually followed by the proposi-
tion that if the third party accepts the stipulation, he may enforce
it. These propositions are actually inconsistent, for if such a stipu-
lation were not a stipulation pour autrui within the meaning and
contemplation of Articles 1890 and 1902 of the Revised Civil Code
as well as Article 35 of the Code of Practice, the third party would
not have a power of acceptance and a right of action arising there-
from. That is, the only reason why such a third party acquires a
right of action upon acceptance is that the stipulation is a stipulation
2. 2 Rob. 523 (La. 1842).
3. See Freedman v. Ratcliff, 183 La. 1, 162 So. 788 (1935); Moriarty v.
Weiss, 196 La. 84, 198 So. 643 (1989).
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pour autrui, which is another way of saying that it is for his benefit
and not for the exclusive benefit of the other party. Of course, what
the majority said in this connection was unimportant in view of its
finding that the plaintiff had a cause of action to secure judicial
recognition of the benefit provided in the preliminary contract
to sell.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Hamiter was on normally
solid ground in contending that if the promisee (owner) would not
have a cause of action, the third party beneficiary would be in the
same position. Such a rule is entirely applicable if the promisor has
any substantive defense against the promisee on the contract con-
taining the stipulation in favor of a third party. But there is consid-
erable doubt concerning the propriety of its application to the instant
facts.
Although the majority seemed to agree that, because of the
failure to include the stipulation for the third party in the final act,
the parol evidence rule would prevent the owner from proving that
it was part of the contract, it is by no means clear that the patrol
evidence rule is applicable. The question involves the problem of
merger which in turn depends on the intention of the parties.' If
they intended to restate their entire contract in the final act of sale,
then anything previously agreed to would be superseded. But the
facts do not make it clear that they so intended. If they did not,
proof of the stipulation contained in the written contract to sell
should be in order, even between the parties, as proof of one of the
provisions of their agreement. Granting that they intended the final
and formal act of sale to be a complete integration of their contract,
superseding the preliminary contract in its entirety, the question of
whether they could do so to the prejudice of a third party beneficiary
whose right had become irrevocable by acceptance would still be
open. The majority opinion held that they could not. If it be
agreed that the fact that the provision beneficial to the third party
was contained in what was viewed as a preliminary contract would
not destroy its normal legal effect, the decision is sound. Further
exploration of the ramifications of the case will appear subsequently
in this review.
4. 196 La. 84, 198 So. 643, 646 (1939). The statement made in Moriarty v.
W iss, that an executory contract to sell ceases to exist when the formal act of
sale is passed, can hardly be deemed conclusive on this point.
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In Davis v. Dees,5 the plaintiff was suing as the purchaser of a
dry cleaning and laundry establishment on the theory that the con-
tract covering the sale of the business had been violated by the
vendor's entering into a competing business, enticing plaintiff's em-
ployees and actively soliciting his customers. The court found that
the inclusion in the sale of the good will of the establishment did
not preclude the vendor from entering into a competing business.
With reference to plaintiff's claim that a sale of good will does
preclude the vendor's enticing his former employees and actively
soliciting former customers, the court, specifically reserving the ques-
tion, found that the evidence did not sustain these claims. The
opinion suggests that the supporting evidence was not properly pre-
sented to the trial court. Be that as it may, the court's disposition
of the case seems to have been in order.
Prior Louisiana jurisprudence has definitely settled the proposi-
tion that a sale of good will does not preclude the vendor's entering
into a competing business, even in the same locality.6 It likewise
has been held that the vendor in support of his new establishment
may engage in the normal means of attracting customers such as
by advertising, including the distribution of handbills, as long as
it does not appear that his efforts are directed at drawing customers
away from his vendee any more than from any other person engaged
in the same kind of enterprise." On the other hand, it has been
held by the first circuit court of appeal' that the obligations of the
vendor of an insurance agency including its good will were violated
when he opened a new establishment and succeeded in rewriting
more than sixty per cent of the renewals as shown on expiration lists
sold to the purchaser, by advertising in a manner that constituted
a direct appeal to former clients. Likewise, the Orleans Court of
Appeal9 found that a motorcycle dealer had offended against the
sale of his franchise to deal in Harley-Davidson motorcycles, includ-
ing good will, by continuing to inform the public that he was still
engaged in the same business as agent for the same manufacturer of
motorcycles. The line both here and at common law seems to be
drawn at the point where the vendor will not be permitted to make
a direct attempt to retain old customers or solicit them to trade with
him."° The courts of appeal cases can be reconciled with the
5. 211 La. 229, 29 So. (2d) 774 (1947).
6. Bergamini v. Bastian, 35 La. Ann. 60 (1883).
7. Ibid.
8. Alfred Mouton, Inc. v. Hebert, 199 So. 172 (La. App. 1940).
9. Lindstrom v. Sauer, 166 So. 636 (La. App. 1936).
10. See Alfred Mouton, Inc. v. Hebert, 199 So. 172 (La. App. 1940).
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Bergamini case on this basis; and it is believed that they provided '
degree of protection to which the vendee of good will is entitled.
In Lamar v. Young," the court refused to enforce specifically an
agreement to sell certain property as a consequence of the failure of
the purchaser to secure the execution of the formal act of sale within
thirty days from the date of the contract to sell as provided therein. 2
The court took the view that there was no basis for holding the
vendor estopped to set up the expiration of the thirty-day period,
and found in the vendor's suggestion that it was his desire to count
the income derived from the sale in one calendar year instead of
another "an excellent reason why it was necessary to complete the
sale" within the stated period.
It is settled jurisprudence in this state that a failure to perform
a contract at a time specifically agreed upon does not ipso facto con-
stitute a default in the absence of a stipulation to such effect, unless,
to use the customary expression, "time is of the essence."' 3 The only
suggestion that time was of the essence lies in the evidence that the
vendor wanted the income to fall in the year 1944 instead of the
year 1945. It is doubtful that the court considered that this fact
would make time of the essence as a matter of law, there being no
stipulation to such effect in the contract. At any rate, the court did
not take the position that the plaintiff's action could not stand
because he was himself in legal default. Its position, apparently,
was that since plaintiff had not undertaken to secure performance
within the thirty-day period he could not be entitled to specific
performance without showing in some way that the defendant was
estopped to set up the failure.
If the defendant had brought suit against the plaintiff to dissolve
the contract, the court would have had the power to permit the
vendee to perform, notwithstanding that the time for performance
stated in the contract had expired. 4 This being true, it seems that
the same power would rest in the court regardless of whether the
case came before it as an action for specific performance or an action
to dissolve for non-performance. Indeed, the effort by defendant
11. 211 La. 837, 30 So. (2d) 858 (1947).
12. The court did not recognize the possibility that the thirty-day period
might have been intended to run from the time the title was found to be valid.
However, the plaintiff's delay was not founded on this point.
13. Erwin v. Fenwick, 6 Mart. (N. S.) 229 (La. 1827); Flournoy v. Miller,
114 La. 1028, 38 So. 818 (1905).
14. Arts. 2046, 2047, La. Civil Code of 1870; Southport Mill, Ltd. v. Ansley,
160 La. 131, 106 So. 720 (1925). See also with reference to completed sales Arts.
2561, 2562, La. Civil Code of 1870.
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to resist performance was in effect a demand that the contract be
dissolved. The court's action, therefore, simmers down to a finding
that there was sufficient reason for not allowing the vendee any time
for performance beyond the contract period. Yet, the plaintiff ap-
parently acted in complete good faith, and there is an absence of
any suggestion that he was trying to take advantage of a delay that
might inure to his benefit. On the other hand, the increase in value
of the property afforded a good reason why the vendor might have
desired to change his mind in addition to his suggestion concerning
his income tax. By and large, the substantial equities seemed to
be with the plaintiff-vendee. Instead of taking the view that there
was no basis for holding the defendant estopped to set up the expira-
tion period by way of defense, the court would have been on sounder
ground by considering- whether there was any basis for denying the
plaintiff the right to perform after the stated time had expired. This
approach would have been consonant with the provisions of the
Code as well as prior jurisprudence, and the shift of emphasis might
have resulted in a different holding. In seemingly suggesting that
a vendee's demand for specific performance will be in order only
if he can show that he called upon the vendor to perform within
the time stated in the contract, the court apparently ignored the
matter of legal default and went considerably beyond any prior
holdings. 5
Two cases were decided during the period involving the prin-
ciple of reformation which seems to have been borrowed from the
common law although there is, perhaps, sufficient basis for it in our
Code."6 In Weber v. H. G. Hill Stores, Incorporated,17 the trial
court's action in dismissing plaintiff's suit on an exception of no
cause of action was reversed and the case was remanded for trial
to afford plaintiff the opportunity to introduce evidence to support
its prayer that a contract of lease be judicially reformed to show the
actual intention of the contracting parties concerning the application
of a provision for determining the monthly rental thereunder. The
plaintiff's petition was entirely adequate, as the court found, to allege
mutual error in the reduction to writing of the agreement reached,
and the only question involved was whether he could produce evi-
dence of the different antecedent agreement and of the error in
15. George v. Lewis, 11 La. Ann. 654 (1856); Joffrion v. Gumbel, 123 La. 391,
48 So. 1007 (1909); Powell v. Codifer & Bonnabel, 167 La. 97, 118 So. 817 (1928);
Davis v. McCain, 171 La. 1011, 132 So. 758 (1931).
16. Art. 1762, La. Civil Code of 1870; Ker v. Evershed, 41 La. Ann. 15, 6 So.
566 (1889).
17. 210 La. 977, 29 So. (2d) 33 (1946).
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committing it to writing sufficiently clear to warrant granting the
relief sought. Like action was taken in Lindsey v. Caraway,. where
the question involved the inclusion in a mineral lease of a proviso
not contained in the original agreement. The court found its earlier
decision in the case of Tate v. Ludeau 9 controlling. Its refusal to
find a charge of fraud sufficient to support plaintiff's claim of can-
cellation was in order.
A plaintiff's attempt to secure a mineral lease without running
any risk thereunder by providing that the only penalty for a failure
to drill would be the ipso facto determination of the lease backfired
on him in Noxon v. Union Oil Company of California.° The lower
court's finding that he had no cause of action for an alleged con-
spiracy arising from the granting by his lessor of a subsequent lease
to the other defendant was affirmed on the ground that plaintiff's
contract of lease was a nullity and unenforceable. Of course, the
defendant's obligation which the plaintiff was seeking to enforce was
not subject to a potestative condition but the plaintiff's obligation
to drill was. The contract failed, therefore, because the plaintiff's
unenforceable obligation could not support the lessor's obligation
under the lease. Such a case actually involves an absence of cause.
The case of Crosby v. Little River Sand and Gravel Develop-
ment2  involved only a question of interpretation of an agreement
betweeri the parties covering the repair of certain machinery and the
admissibility of certain secondary evidence. In admitting the evi-
dence the court recognized that there has in recent years been some
relaxation in the stringent rule of Article 224822 providing that books
of merchants cannot be given as evidence in their favor. The suit
was for a balance due for labor and materials furnished.
The court found it unnecessary to refer to any authority in ad-
justing the rights between a building contractor suing for a balance
due on a construction contract and an owner who resisted on the
ground of the contractor's failure to properly fulfill his contract in
Wilson v. Peak.28 The dispositions made by the court had ample sup-
port in the evidence.
18. 211 La. 898, 30 So. (2d) 182 (1947).
19. 195 La. 954, 197 So. 612 (1940).
20. 210 La. 1074, 29 So. (2d) 67 (1946).
21. 81 So. (2d) 226 (La. 1947).
22. Art. 2248, La. Civil Code of 1870.
23. 210 La. 969, 28 So. (2d) 677 (1946).
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As far as the present classification is concerned, the case of
Thompson v. Thompson24 is relevant because of its position that the
holder of a valid option to purchase certain lands would not be en-
titled to specific performance against the claims of certain heirs that
the transfer to his vendor, although in the form of a sale, was in fact
a disguised donation. The court recognized that if the option holder
had secured a conveyance of the property before the claims of the
heirs were judicially asserted he would have had a title that was un-
assailable under the doctrine of McDuffie v. Walker.2" Its decision
rested on the proposition that as the holder of an option, plaintiff
had merely a right, less than absolute, to specific performance which
was inferior to the real interest held by the heirs in the property
transferred by their ancestor by disguised donation. A dissenting
opinion by Justice Hamiter reminded the court that its position
might be difficult to defend in view of the fact that the holder of an
option has a right superior to that of a transferee of the property
who takes after recordation of the option, and yet the transferee's
right would be superior to the rights of the heirs thereafter asserted.
There was no suggestion from the court as to how it would solve.
this problem if and when it should arise.
It is perhaps too late to suggest that traditionally specific per-
formance is viewed in French-civilian law as the normal remedy for
the breach of such an obligation, with damages as the exceptional
case where obligations to do are involved.26 Treating the right to
specific performance as an exceptional remedy is just another sur-
render to the pressure of common law influences. It is not suggested,
however, that a civilian view of the nature of specific performance
in obligations of this character would have conduced to a different
result. One can hardly read the opinion without feeling that the
parties who were really entitled to profit from the discovery of oil
on the land were protected, yet there is a strong indication that the
set-back administered to faith in the public record may be the mak-
ing of bad law.
24. 211 La. 468, 80 So. (2d) 821 (1947).
25. 125 La. 152, 51 So. 100 (1909).
26. See Note (1947) 21 Tulane L. Rev. 499.
